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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a. Nature of the Case
The Idaho Recording Act bars Nampa Highway District No. 1 ("Nampa Highway
District" or the "Respondent") from quieting the right of way's title against Brian K. Knight and
Lisa M. Knights' (the "Knights") fee simple ownership of the real property located at 2303 W.
Orchard Ave. Nampa Idaho, 83631 (the "Property"). Although the Nampa Highway District was
granted a right of way deed in 1945, it failed to record the right of way deed until 1989. In 1963,
18 years before the right of way deed was recorded, the Property was sold to Billy and Vonda
Downs ("the Downs"). The Downs acquired the Property as good faith and bona fide purchasers.
The Downs then conveyed the Property to the Knights in 1998. In 2012, the Knights
granted a deed of trust on the Property to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
("MERS") as nominee for Quicken Loans Inc. ("Quicken Loans") and its successors and assigns.
Since the Knights received the property from the Downs, the Shelter Rule protects the Knights",
MERS' and Quicken Loans' respective interests in the Property against the Nampa Highway
District's quiet title claim.

b. Course of Proceedings
On October 25, 2018, Nampa Highway District filed suit to quiet title to a 33' wide strip
of land described in a 1941 "Right of Way Deed." The land in the "Right of Way Deed" was
deeded to Nampa Highway District in 1941 from the then-current owners of the land, J.G. and
Ora Lupton. Unfortunately, the Nampa Highway District waited until 1989, more than 45 years
later, to record the deed. That delay resulted in the confusion that precipitated this case.
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After filing its complaint, Nampa Highway District moved for summary judgment asking
the trial court to decree that it had a fee simple title, or, in the alternative, a right of way across
the 33' wide strip ofland contained within the Lupton deed.
Defendants Brian K. Knight and Lisa M. Knight ("Knights"), as owners, Quicken Loans,
Inc. ("Quicken Loans"), as servicer, and Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc.
("MERS"), as the current beneficiary under a deed of trust from the Knights, filed cross-motions
for summary judgment and opposed Nampa Highway District's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Knights and Quicken Loans asserted that, except for 11' of the strip of land occupied by W.
Orchard Ave., the Recording Act and Shelter Rule made Nampa Highway District's claims to
title void. MERS joined the Knights' and Quicken Loans' briefing.
On April 1, 2019 the trial court entered an Order on Motions for Summary Judgment,
granting Nampa Highway District's Motion for Summary Judgment. The final judgment and
decree quieted title to the entire 3 3' strip of land in favor of Nampa Highway District, declaring
that Nampa Highway District had a fee simple interest in the 33' strip of land. That judgment
was entered on April 10, 2019.
The Knights filed a timely notice of appeal on May 10, 2019. Quicken Loans and MERS
filed timely notices of appeal on May 22, 2019.

c. Statement of facts
1.

The underlying lawsuit involves the real property located at 2303 W. Orchard

Ave. Nampa Idaho, 83631 (the "Property"). 1 For reference, please see the aerial photograph
attached as Appendix 1 which shows the Property with the label 'Knight. ' 2
2.
I
2

J.G. and Ora Lupton acquired the Property on April 5, 1920. 3

R. pp. 324, 333-34.
The photograph is Exhibit E to the Affidavit of Eric Shannon, R. p. 338

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT QUICKEN LOANS INC.'S OPENING BRIEF - 2

3.

In 1921, Nampa Highway District built W. Orchard Avenue over a strip of land

along the front of the Property. 4 W. Orchard Avenue occupies the front eleven (11) feet of the
Property. 5
4.

Twenty years after the construction of W. Orchard Avenue, on August 4, 1941,

the Luptons conveyed a 33-foot-wide strip of land on the front of their Property (the "Right of
Way") to Nampa Highway District (the "Right of Way Deed"). 6 The strip of land included W.
Orchard A venue.
5.

The purpose of the right of way was to "improve the road." 7 However, Nampa

Highway District did not improve the road-it simply maintained the same 11 foot road it built
in 1921. 8
6.

Nampa Highway District failed to record the Right of Way Deed.

7.

In 1945, Ora Lupton died, and all of her right, title and interest in the Property

transferred to her surviving spouse, J.G. Lupton. 9
8.

JG Lupton died in 1958. A decree of partial distribution conveyed property

including the Property from JG Lupton's estate to his heirs, Marvin Carroll Lupton and Howard
Wayne Lupton. 10
9.

On May 18, 1958, Marvin Carroll Lupton conveyed his interest in the Property to

Howard Wayne Lupton. 11 The conveyance recites on its face that the transfer was for valuable
consideration. 12
3

R. p. 269, para. 6.
R. p. 325, para. 9 a-c.
5
R. p. 406.
6
R. p. 323-24, 331-32.
7
R. p. 326, para. 9.g (emphasis added).
8
R. p. 406.
9
R. p. 475, 271.
10
R. p. 475; R. p. 256-261, p. 271-2.
4
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10.

Howard Wayne Lupton conveyed the Property to the Downs in exchange for

"good and valuable consideration" on June 2, 1963.13 The conveyance was recorded in the
Canyon County Real Property Records on June 25, 1963. 14
11.

Nampa Highway District finally recoded the Right of Way Deed on February 21,

1989, 48 years after receiving it. 15
12.

The Downs conveyed the Property to the Knights on July 10, 1998. The

conveyance was recorded in the Canyon County Records on July 10, 1998. 16
13.

The Knights are the current owners of the Property. 17

14.

In 2012, the Knights granted a Deed of Trust to their Property to Chicago Title

Insurance Company as Trustee on behalf of MERS, as the beneficiary as nominee for Quicken
Loans, and its successors and assigns. 18
15.

No conveyance from the 1945 decree transferring Ora Lupton's interest in the

Property to J.G though the conveyance to the Knights, or deed of trust to MERS as nominee for
Quicken Loans and its successors and assigns, makes any exception for the right of way claimed
by the Nampa Highway District under the Right of Way Deed. 19 And beyond the pavement
marking the 11 feet of road it was on, there were no boundaries or markers indicating the
presence of the Right of Way Deed.

11

R. p. 475; R. pp. 262-63, 272.
R. p. 386.
13
R. p. 388.
14
R. p. 272, 367, 388-89.
15
R. p. 323-24, 331-32.
16
R. p. 269, 281-82,
17
R. pp. 324, 333-34.
18
R. pp. 67, 77-94, 122.
19
R. 365-389 Exs. A, E-G.
12
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16.

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Nampa Highway

District. 20 The District Court concluded that because Howard Lupton and the Downs had actual
notice of 11 feet of highway that was constructed in 1921, they were on constructive notice of
the Right of Way Deed executed in 1941 prior to its recording in 1989. 21 Accordingly, the
District Court found the Shelter Rule did not protect the Knights, MERS, or Quicken Loans
because they did not acquire title through a bona fide purchaser. 22 Because the District Court
erroneously concluded that neither Howard Lupton or the Downs were bona fide purchasers, it
erroneously failed to give the Knights, MERS and Quicken Loans the benefit of the Shelter Rule
by voiding any right of way beyond the paved edge of W. Orchard Ave. 23
17. This appeal followed.

2. ISSUES ON APPEAL
a) Did the District Court err in refusing to protect the Knights under the "Shelter Rule"
which provides that one who is not a bona fide purchaser, but who takes an interest in
property from a bona fide purchaser, may be sheltered in the latter's protective status?
b) Did the District Court err in finding that Howard Lupton and/or the Downs had
constructive notice of a deeded right of way extending 22' beyond the edge of W.
Orchard Ave.?
c) Did the District Court err in granting Nampa Highway District fee simple title to the land
in the Right of Way Deed?

20

R. p. 474-484.
R. p. 480.
22 Id.
23 Id.
21
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3. LEGAL STANDARD
a. Standard of Review
The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is the same standard used by
the trial court in ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is only allowed "if the pleadings,
affidavits, and discovery documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter oflaw." 24
4. ARGUMENT
a. The Court Erred in Ruling that the Knights, and thus MERS and Quicken Loans,
Were Not Protected Under the Shelter Rule.
i.

The District Court misapplied the Recording Act and Shelter Rule.

1. The Recording Act
"Purchasers of real property must record their interests in order to protect them from

other claimants. In Idaho, the first recorded conveyances of real property, taken in good faith and
for valuable consideration, except leases not exceeding one year, have priority over subsequent
purchasers or mortgagees of the same property."25 See also Idaho Code §55-812 ("[e]very
conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not exceeding one (1) year, is void as
against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof, in good
faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded.").
Further, Idaho Code §55-606 provides "[e]very grant or conveyance of an estate in real
property is conclusive against the grantor, also against everyone subsequently claiming under
him, except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a valuable consideration,

24

See e.g. Dickinson Frozen Foods v. J.R. Simplot Co., 164 Idaho 669,434 P.3d 1275 (2019)
(citations omitted).
25
Sun Valley Land & Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862, 866, 853 P.2d 607, 611 (Ct. App.
1993)
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acquires a title or lien by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly recorded." "The
purpose of the recording act in a race-notice jurisdiction, like Idaho, is to allow recorded interests
to be effective against unrecorded interests when the recorded interest is taken for a valuable
consideration and in good faith, i.e., without knowledge, either actual or constructive, that
unrecorded interests exist. "26
ii.
The Shelter Rule
"A bona fide purchaser is one who takes real property by paying valuable consideration
and in good faith, i.e., without knowing of adverse claims."27 "The theory behind the rule is to
protect innocent purchasers and to allow them to obtain and convey unsullied interests."28
"Generally, a person must take property through a 'conveyance' in order to be afforded the
protective status of a bona fide purchaser."29
"The 'Shelter Rule' provides that one who is not a bona fide purchaser, but who takes an
interest in property from a bona fide purchaser, may be sheltered in the latter's protective
status."30 When adopting this rule, the Sun Valley Land court recognized "a bona fide purchaser
can transfer good title to a person who has notice of a prior adverse equity or right." 31 "Once the
right to have a mistake in a deed rectified is shut off by conveyance to a bona fide purchaser, a
grantee from such purchaser is entitled to the same protection."32
The District Court concluded that because Howard Lupton and the Downs had actual
notice of 11 feet of highway that was constructed in 1921, they were on constructive notice of
26

Regan v. JeffD., 157 Idaho 758, 763-764, 339 P.3d 1162, 1167-1168 (2014) (internal
quotations omitted).
27
Sun Valley Land & Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862, 866, 853 P.2d 607,611 (Ct. App.
1993) citing LC. § 55-606; § 55-812.
2s Id.
29 Id.
30
Sun Valley Land & Minerals v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862, 868, 853 P.2d 607,611 (1993).
31 Id.
32
Regan v. Jeff D., 157 Idaho at 763, 339 P .3d at 1167 (internal quotations omitted).
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the Right of Way Deed executed in 1941 prior to its recording in 1989. 33 Accordingly, the
District Court found the Shelter Rule did not protect the Knights, Quicken Loans, or MERS,
because they did not acquire title through a bona fide purchaser. Because the District Court
erroneously concluded that neither Howard Lupton nor the Downs were bona fide purchasers, it
erroneously failed to give the Knights, MERS and Quicken Loans the benefit of the Shelter Rule
by voiding any right of way beyond the paved edge ofW. Orchard Ave.
J.G. and Ora Lupton acquired the Property in 1920. 34 J.G. and Ora did not grant Nampa
Highway District the Right of Way deed until 1941. 35
In 1945, J.G. Lupton acquired full title to the Property through a judicial decree after his
wife passed away. 36 J.G. passed away in 1958. His heirs, Marvin and Howard, inherited the
Property. 37 On the same day, Marvin conveyed his interests to Howard. 38 The warranty deed
between Marvin and Howard stated the conveyance was made "for and in consideration" and did
not provide a reservation for the Right of Way Deed. 39
In 1963, Howard and his wife Maxine, conveyed the Property to the Downs "for and in
[monetary] consideration" and for "other good and valuable consideration."40 The deed did not
reserve an exception for the Right of Way Deed. 41

33

Order p. 7.
See Statement ofFacts ("FACTS") at para. 2.
35
FACTS at para. 4.
36
FACTS at para. 7.
37
FACTS at para. 8.
38
FACTS at para. 9.
39 Id.
4
FACTS at para. 10.
41 Id.
34

°
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There is no evidence that Howard Lupton or the Downs had actual knowledge of the
Right of Way Deed. The only possible way to deny them bona fide purchaser status is to
establish they have constructive notice of the Right of Way Deed.
In 1998, nine years after Nampa Highway District finally recorded the Right of Way
Deed, the Downs conveyed their interest in the Property to the Knights. In 2012, the Knights
granted a Deed of Trust to their Property to Chicago Title as Trustee for the beneficiary- MERS,
as nominee for Quicken Loans and its successors and assigns. The Knights, MERS and Quicken
Loans would not be bona fide purchasers, but are protected by the Shelter Rule. The Knights
took title to Property from bona fide purchasers, the Downs. Under the Shelter Rule, the Knights
thus gain the benefit of the Downs protective status and received clean title to the Property. 42
The Shelter Rule also protects the interests of MERS and Quicken Loans under the Deed
of Trust. The Knights granted the legal title they received from the Downs to MERS as nominee
for Quicken Loans and its successors and assigns. The grantee under the deed of trust obtained
an interest the same rights to the title as those held by the Knights. 43 ("When a deed of trust is
executed and delivered, the legal title of the property passes to the trustee [from the borrower]").
Because Howard Lupton and the Downs are bona fide purchasers, there can be no dispute
that the Shelter Rule invalidates the Right of Way Deed as against the Knights, MERS, Quicken
Loans, or their successors in interest.

42

43

See Sun Valley Land & Minerals, 123 Idaho at 868.
See ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 302 P.3d 18, 24 (Idaho 2013)
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b. The District Court erred in finding that Howard Lupton and/or the Downs had
constructive notice of a deeded right of way extending 22' beyond the edge ofW.
Orchard Ave.
"Imputed or constructive knowledge is the law's substitute for actual knowledge. It is a
legally postulated notice of facts not otherwise perceived and recognized."

44

"Such notice may

arise from official records and other documents by which a person is legally bound, from
communications to an agent or predecessor in interest, or from knowledge of certain facts which
should impart notice of the ultimate fact in issue ... In [the later situation], extemporaneous facts
which are sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent person upon an inquiry of a possible conflicting
interest, will be treated as providing constructive notice. " 45 Further, "[w ]hen a property owner
possesses knowledge of extemporaneous facts which would reasonably indicate the possibility of
an adverse use on the property, the owner is required to investigate. 46 But courts have recognized
that the existence of a physical street, alone, is no indication of any rights or title that may exist

beyond the bounds of that street. See State of Indiana v. Anderson, 47 ("[ t]he general rule [is] that
a purchaser is not charged with notice of a right-of-way which is not discoverable upon an
inspection of the premises at the time of his purchase."). See also State of Indiana v.

Cinko 48(same); W Cent. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. James River Broad. Co., 49 (holding the same).
Idaho has adopted similar logic. In Kaupp, 50 the district court found that the mere
existence of a manhole in a city street adjacent to property was sufficient notice to impute

44

Kaupp v. Hailey, 110 Idaho 337,340, 715 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. l986)(citing 58 Am. Jur.
2d Notice secs. 2-11 (1971)) (emphasis added).
45
Kaupp v. Hailey, 110 Idaho 337,340, 715 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 1986)(citing 58 Am. Jur.
2d Notice secs. 2-11 (1971)).
46
Id. (citing 55 A.L.R.2d 1144 (1951)).
47
State ofIndiana v. Anderson 170 N.E. 2d. 812, 815 (Ind. 1960)
48
State of Indiana v. Cinko 292 N.E. 2d 847 (Ind. 1973)
49
W Cent. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. James River Broad. Co. 393 N.W.2d 83, 86 (S.D. 1986)
5
°Kaupp v. Hailey, 110 Idaho 337,340, 715 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 1986)
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knowledge to a property owner of a pipeline running under the property. 51 The Court of Appeals
squarely rejected that contention. Instead, it found that "the mere existence of the manhole does
not create a duty to inquire." 52 Instead, the Court confirmed that only the facts of the case (such
as "line markers and stakes, above ground fixtures and controls and exposed lines themselves")
would create a duty to inquire further.
In this case, the use of an eleven-foot strip of road does not logically imply the existence
of a thirty-three foot right of way or create a duty to investigate the road any further. To the
contrary, the evidence in record establishes that the Nampa Highway district used the eleven feet
of Knights property for W. Orchard Ave. for twenty years with no ri ght of way, whatsoever.
Thus, undisputed evidence shows that it is outside the scope of a reasonable inquiry to check for
a large and unused right of way simply because a road is present. The additional twenty-two feet
(22 ') was not necessary for the construction or maintenance of the existing road. It was only
granted in anticipation of some future improvement of the road, (although it was evidently never
used after it was granted). There is nothing about the existence of the road itself that would
reasonably indicate the existence of an additional deeded, but unrecorded, twenty-two foot (22 ')
right of way. As such, the evidence in the record does not support any finding that Howard
Lupton or the Downs (as predecessors to the Knights) have constructive notice of the Right of
Way Deed.

51

The Kaupp case was analyzing the "open and notorious" element for prescriptive easements,
but considered that element to be in accord with the concepts of imputed or constructive
knowledge.
s2 Id.
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c. The district court erred by finding that the Nampa Highway District owns the 33
feet of land in fee simple. If Nampa Highway District has any property interest, it is
an easement.
The presumption is "[w]hen land is dedicated as a street for public use, the
landowner owns to the center of the street and the public acquires an easement, not a title
in fee simple."53
"An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. " 54 "Express easements may be
created by either reservation or exception. "55 "An express easement by reservation reserves to
the grantor some new right in the property being conveyed; an express easement by exception
operates by withholding title to a portion of the conveyed property." 56 "Because an express
easement is an interest in real property, it may only be created by a written instrument."57 "At a
minimum, a valid express easement must identify the land subject to the easement and express
the intent of the parties. 58 "Thus, while specific words are not required to create an express
easement, the writing must make clear the parties' intention to establish a servitude." 59
"When this Court interprets or construes a deed, 'the primary goal is to seek and give
effect to the real intention of the parties. "'60 "If the deed is ambiguous, the trier of fact must

53

See e.g. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 507, 65 P.3d 525, 529 (2003) citing Idaho Rev.Code§
3091 (1908)) (current version with amendments at Idaho Code§ 55-309 (2002)) (emphasis
added); LC. 55-309.
54
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 62, 190 P.3d 876, 881 (2008) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
55
Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212,218,280 P.3d 715, 721 (2012)(internal citations omitted).
56 Id.
57
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
58
. Id. citing Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,233, 76 P.3d 969, 977 (2003) (citing Nw. Pipeline
Corp. v. Forrest Weaver Farm, Inc., 103 Idaho 180, 181, 646 P.2d 422,423 (1982) (emphasis
added).
59 Id.
60
Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212,218,280 P.3d 715, 721 (2012) citing Porter v. Bassett, 146
Idaho 399,404, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217 (2008).
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'determine the intent of the parties according to the language of the conveyance and the
circumstances surrounding the transaction. "'61 "However, if the language of a deed is plain and
unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the deed itself and extrinsic
evidence is not admissible." 62 "Ambiguity may be found where the language of the deed is
subject to conflicting interpretations."63
Preliminarily, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that ''when land is dedicated as a street for
public use, the landowner owns to the center of the street and the public acquires an easement,
not a title in fee simple."64 More substantively, the Right of Way Deed specifically noted the
parties' intentions. The Right of Way Deed limits the conveyance of the strip of land "for use as
a public highway." 65 No other purpose or intention was noted in the Right of Way Deed. And
because the language specifies the use, the grant is limited to that of an easement. See Drew v.
Sorensen, 66 ("In Idaho, 'an easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose

that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner.'").
To the extent the Right of Way Deed survived, the District Court's construction of fee
simple title conveyance is in error.

5. CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in its application of the Recording Act and Shelter Rule. Nampa
Highway District's Right of Way Deed is void against the Knights, MERS, Quicken Loans, and
their successors and assigns. The judgment should be reversed and vacated. Further, since there
61

Id. (citing Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508, 65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003)).
Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212,218,280 P.3d 715, 721 (2012) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
63
Readv. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497,499, 112 P.3d 785, 787 (2005) (citing Neider, 138 Idaho at
508, 65 P.3d at 530).
64
Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 507, 65 P.3d 525, 529 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
65
R. p. 323-24; 331-32.
66
Drew v. Sorensen 133 Idaho 534, 540, 989 P.2d 276,282 (1999)(citations omitted.)
62
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are no questions of material fact, the case should be remanded with instructions to the District
Court to quiet title to the Property by voiding the Right of Way Deed and recognizing only the
eleven feet of right of way that undisputedly exists as a matter of law for the current W. Orchard
Avenue.

DATED this

~
.,l ~ day of September, 2019.
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Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A.
225 North 9th Street, Suite 820
P.O. Box 1097
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 331-1529
kgourley@idalaw.com

U.S. Mail, Postage Paid
D Hand Delivered
D Fax Transmittal
~ iCourt Notification

E. Don Copple
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, L.L.P
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, ID 83701
edcopple@davisoncopple.com

D U.S. Mail, Postage Paid
D Hand Delivered
D Fax Transmittal

Sheila R. Schwager
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
sschwager@hawleytroxell.com
llundberg@hawleytroxell.com

~ iCourt Notification

0

U.S. Mail, Postage Paid

D Hand Delivered
D Fax Transmittal

~ iCourt Notification

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT QUICKEN LOANS INC.'S OPENING BRIEF - 15

Appendix I

